We analyze the extent to which firms adjust corporate payouts on the margin in response to a shock to external financing conditions. We document significant reductions in corporate payouts -both dividends and (to a larger extent) share repurchases -during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Payout reductions are more likely in firms with higher leverage, more valuable growth options, and lower cash balances -i.e., those more susceptible to the negative consequences of a credit supply shock.
Introduction
Several prior studies argue that the 2008-2009 period was characterized by a shock to the cost and supply of credit in the aftermath of the sharp decline in housing prices and subsequent subprime mortgage defaults.
1 Consistent with such a shock, Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, (2011) , and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) report significant declines in lending from liquidity constrained banks. In addition, increases in uncertainty over the duration of the crisis and over the governmental responses arguably increased the cost of external funds more generally. Further consistent with an abrupt change in the supply of credit and/or the cost of external funds, a large proportion of the CFOs surveyed in Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) conclude that they experienced credit rationing, higher costs of borrowing, and difficulties in initiating or renewing credit lines during the crisis.
We use the credit crisis of 2008-2009 as a natural experiment to study two related issues.
First, to what extent do firms adjust their payout policies in response to an exogenous shift in the relative costs and benefits of internal and external financing sources? Second, what roles do share repurchases and dividends play in the process of managing cash and internal capital?
If the costs of holding cash (i.e. agency costs) are unchanged, we expect firms to respond to the crisis and the associated restriction in credit supply by reducing corporate payouts and retaining a greater portion of their operating cash flows. This substitution from external to internal capital could, therefore, attenuate any adverse impacts of an external financing shock on investment and internal resources (cash balances), particularly for firms facing greater external financing frictions. Moreover, to the extent that repurchases represent a more flexible form of payout, we expect firms to sequence payout reductions such that repurchases are reduced prior to any reductions in dividends.
Alternatively, to the extent that the financial crisis period is associated with a large shock to demand due to the general reduction in wealth caused by falling housing prices (Mian and Sufi, 2010) , this reduces firm growth opportunities and, consequently the demand for funds. Because the diminished growth opportunities are associated with greater agency costs of cash retention, this alternative view predicts that, if anything, the crisis period will be associated with greater payouts and lower cash retention. We provide evidence on these predictions by analyzing changes in corporate payout policy, investment, and cash retention before and during the recent financial crisis. indicating that the decline in payout is not simply due to reduced earnings. This decline appears to be driven by a large reduction in the repurchase payout ratio; the dividend payout ratio exhibits only a small decline. Similarly, the aggregate dollar amount of payout also declines 58% from 2006 to 2009 and this is also driven by reductions in repurchases.
We find in panel regressions that firms that are more highly levered, have lower cash balances, and greater investment opportunities are more likely to reduce payouts during the financial crisis. These findings fit with the view that those firms with greater susceptibility to an external financing shock are more likely to turn to payout reductions as a substitute financing source. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the cash savings from payout reductions are economically meaningful, representing 31% of the firm's pre-crisis cash balance and 53% of its pre-crisis level of investment. In fact, we show through a pro-forma analysis that in the absence of payout reductions, a large proportion of the sample firms would have been unable to implement their chosen operating plans unless they were able to access (particularly costly) external financing.
Finally, we report several findings consistent with the view that firms use the cash savings from payout reductions to either increase cash reserves or to fund corporate investment.
First, we find in panel regressions that the magnitude of cash savings from reductions in payout is more strongly associated with cash balances during the crisis than prior to the crisis. Second, using a propensity score matching procedure and a difference-in-difference analysis, we find that the change in investment for firms that eliminate payouts to shareholders during the financial crisis is greater than that of matched firms that continue to make positive shareholder payouts.
Third, in firm fixed-effect regressions, we find that, after controlling for investment opportunities, cash flow, and leverage, the cash savings from payout reductions are associated with higher levels of investment. Finally, we compare changes in cash holdings and in investment for firms that reduce their payout during the crisis with those that made no payouts in the years prior to the crisis. For the latter group, payout reductions are obviously not a feasible source of funds through the crisis period. Consistent with payout reductions being used as a source of funds, we find that reductions in cash balances and in investment during the crisis are significantly greater for zero payout firms than for firms that reduce payout.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that the financial crisis increased the cost of external financing sufficiently that a number of firms turned to payout reductions as a substitute form of financing. These findings complement and extend those of several recent papers that study the real effects of the financial crisis. For example, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) and report that firms bypass attractive investment opportunities due to borrowing constraints during the financial crisis. Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2009) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) empirically analyze the impact of the credit crisis on investment by focusing on ex ante heterogeneity in the firm's financial policies; specifically, the maturity structure of long-term debt and cash holdings, respectively. The identifying assumption in these studies is that the firm's financial policies are pre-determined, thereby allowing the authors to identify a causal link that runs from a shock to the supply of credit to investment. Our study differs in that we study changes in payout policy to analyze the extent to which certain financial policies themselves adjust on the margin in response to the credit supply shock of the financial crisis. In this sense, our study complements that of Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2012) who report evidence consistent with high liquidity suppliers altering their trade credit policies in response to a credit supply shock, and Kahle and Stulz (2013) who analyze whether cross-sectional variation in financing policies during the crisis are consistent with a bank lending shock (as opposed to a demand shock) being a first-order determinant of these policies.
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In focusing on payout policy, our study also relates to a long list of studies that document the reluctance of firms to reduce dividends. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) report that CFOs state they would rather cut investment than cut dividends. Similarly, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2012) report that even those firms facing cash shortfalls exhibit a strong reluctance to cut dividends. By contrast, several studies note that share repurchases represent a much more flexible form of payout. In the Brav et al. (2005) survey, CFOs view the flexibility of repurchases as one of its primary attributes. This flexibility is supported by the findings in Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) regarding the distribution of transitory earnings, and is consistent with Leary and Michaely's (2011) observation that, unlike the case with dividends, managers do not appear to make any attempt to smooth share repurchases through time. Our findings fit well with these general observations in that we find that the financial flexibility obtained by payout reductions during the financial crisis is obtained primarily by reductions in share repurchases. 3 Although we do observe an increased frequency of dividend reductions during the crisis period, our findings generally reinforce the view that dividend cuts are one of the more costly sources of financial flexibility.
2 Almeida et al. (2010) also provide some indirect evidence on this issue. For the set of 77 firms that had a large fraction of their long-term debt maturing soon after the onset of the crisis, they compute changes in other policy variables as a fraction of the amount of long-term debt maturing in 2008. 3 Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2012) also report that dividends are more persistent through the financial crisis than are share repurchases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the possible effects of the crisis on payout policy and related literature. Section 3 briefly describes the data. Section 4 presents evidence of changes in payout policy. Section 5 examines cash levels and investment following payout reductions and section 6 concludes.
Possible Effects of the Financial Crisis on Payout Policy
In recent years, a large literature argues that there are both costs and benefits associated with cash retention. Under the so-called precautionary motive for holding cash, firms build cash reserves as a valuable buffer against shocks to its cash flows or investment opportunities. Thus, firms will tend to hold greater cash balances when they face more costly external finance, when their cash flows are more volatile and when their investment opportunities are more valuable.
Several studies report evidence consistent with these predictions. For example, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find that cash balances are positively related to cash flow variability, market-to-book ratios, and measures of constrained access to external capital.
Similarly, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbenner (2004) find that firms exhibit a greater propensity to save cash from their cash flow when they face higher costs of external finance. 4 Finally, Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that the marginal value of cash is greater in firms with limited access to external capital markets than in firms that are less financially constrained, while Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that this cash 'premium' is linked to the role of cash in allowing firms to invest in valuable projects that would otherwise go unfunded.
Although the above studies ascribe a valuable role to cash retention in mitigating potential underinvestment, other studies highlight the potential agency costs of cash retention.
For example, Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , and La Porta et al. (2000) argue that managers have the incentive to over-retain cash because this enables them to divert resources in a way that benefits themselves at the expense of outside investors. Additionally, the excess cash can reduce the pressure on management to operate efficiently. Consistent with such agency costs of cash retention, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that firms with weaker governance spend excess cash on capital expenditures and acquisitions more quickly than do firms with better governance. Moreover, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that $1.00 of cash in poorly governed firms is valued at only $0.42 to $0.88.
The above studies imply that firms weigh a wide set of relative costs and benefits of internal and external financing sources in arriving at their optimal cash retention, investment, and payout policies. One objective of our study is to gain greater insight into how (if at all) firms adjust their payout policies in response to an exogenous shift in the relative costs and benefits of internal and external financing sources.
The credit crisis of 2008-09 arguably represents such a shock. Several authors argue that the onset of the credit crisis in late 2007 represents a negative shock to the supply of credit.
Consistent with such a shock, Almeida et al. (2010) report a dramatic increase in credit spreads in late 2007 for both short-term and longer-term credit instruments across the credit quality spectrum. Moreover, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) examine bank lending during the financial crisis and find that lending fell across all types of loans: investment grade and non-investment grade; term loans and credit lines; and those used for corporate restructuring as well as those used for general corporate purposes and working capital. These findings support the view that the credit crisis is associated with a substantial increase in the cost of debt financing and a decline in the supply of available credit in the subsequent period. In addition, Gorton (2010) argues that the credit crisis led to a more general upheaval in capital markets, leading to flight to quality. Such a flight to quality might increase the costs of all forms of external capital, not just bank or other forms of debt.
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To the extent that the credit crisis is associated with a sharp reduction in the supply of credit and/or a general increase in the cost of external funds, we hypothesize that this increases the marginal benefit of cash retention during the financial crisis. If the costs of holding cash remain unchanged (or at least do not increase), we predict that firms respond by reducing corporate payout and retaining a greater portion of their operating cash flows in order to enhance financial flexibility. Following the intuition of Almeida et al. (2011) , this should be particularly true for firms with greater financing frictions and those that are more dependent on external capital. Moreover, to the extent that repurchases represent a more flexible form of payout, we expect greater reductions in share repurchases than in ordinary dividends.
The predictions for cash and investment levels are less clear. If firms increase cash retention in order to undertake investment opportunities that would otherwise go unfunded, we expect no change in the firm's cash holdings or its investment. On the other hand, if the crisis period raises uncertainty about the future supply of credit, firms might respond to this uncertainty by using payout reductions to not only fund current investment, but to build cash reserves for future investment.
An alternative view of the crisis period is that the predominant impact is a shock to demand, rather than a shock to the supply of financing. As described in Kahle and Stulz (2013) , there are many reasons why demand would have decreased during the crisis, including (i) a contraction in consumer credit associated with the demise of the subprime lending market, (ii) the general decline in household wealth, and (iii) a shift away from consumption and towards saving following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In addition, Kahle and Stulz (2013) Other studies report that the credit supply shock is associated with real effects. In a survey of CFOs in December 2008, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) , report that financially constrained firms planned to substantially reduce investment and employment.
Similarly, Duchin et al. (2010) find direct evidence of a decline in corporate investment during the onset of the crisis, with the decline being greatest for firms with low cash reserves. Finally, Almeida et al. (2010) report that firms whose debt was maturing shortly after the onset of the crisis reduced investment much more substantially than those whose debt matured after 2008.
As noted earlier, our study differs from these prior studies in an important respect. In analyzing the real effects of the credit crisis, the above studies assume that the firm's financial policies are largely pre-determined, then ask whether real outcomes are associated with differences in ex ante financial policies. By contrast, our study is more concerned with how the financial policies themselves are adjusted by firms in response to the credit crisis. Specifically, we focus on the firm's payout policy. Unlike the firm's debt level, its maturity structure or the firm's cash holdings, there is considerable flexibility in the amount that the firm chooses to pay out to its shareholders each quarter. This flexibility is arguably much greater for payouts in the form of share repurchases than for those that are dividends. As a result any impact of a shock to the supply of external capital can be attenuated by adjustments in payout policy.
Sample and Data Description
Our initial sample includes all firms listed on Compustat from 1990 to 2010. We exclude 
Changes in corporate payout

Descriptive evidence
We begin our analysis by reporting the number of firms that pay dividends, repurchase shares, and payout in both forms during each year between 1990 and 2010. The data, reported in Table 1 , indicate that while the proportion of firms that pay dividends remains relatively constant throughout the financial crisis, the proportion of firms that repurchase is much more variable.
After a slight increase in the proportion of firms that repurchase shares in 2006-2008, there is a sharp decrease in 2009 from 21% to 12% of the sample firms. We find a similarly sharp decline when we consider the set of firms that both pay dividends and repurchase shares. This set declines from 6.9% of the sample in 2007 to 3.0% in 2009.
[Insert Table 1] To provide further evidence on changes in payouts during the financial crisis, Figure that of dividends has prompted speculation that repurchases would eventually replace dividends (Skinner, 2008) . the aggregate level, firms reduce payouts to shareholders during the financial crisis. This reduction is much greater for share repurchases than for dividends. Moreover, the fact that total payout ratios decline during the crisis implies that firms cut shareholder payouts by a greater amount than the decline in earnings during the crisis.
[Insert Figure 4 ] 
Determinants of payout reductions
To understand the determinants of payout reduction at the firm level, we estimate logit models of whether firms reduce total payout, 
We expect the likelihood of a payout reduction to be positively associated with the company's investment opportunities, volatility, and the existence of negative earnings, but negatively associated with cash flow, cash balance, and firm size. The financial crisis dummy tests whether the likelihood of a payout reduction increases during the crisis period after controlling for other determinants of payout reductions. The interaction terms test whether the impact of the crisis on the likelihood of payout reductions is stronger for firms that would appear, ex ante, to be more susceptible to the effects of a credit supply shock; specifically firms with higher leverage, lower cash balances, and more profitable investment opportunities. Table 3 reports marginal effects for each variable along with robust standard errors in parentheses. Consistent with our expectations, the results in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 3 indicate that the likelihood of reductions in total payout, dividends, and repurchases is positively associated with leverage and the existence of negative earnings, and is negatively related to cash flow and firm size.
Our primary variable of interest, the financial crisis dummy, is significantly positive in columns 1, 3, and 5, implying that the propensity to reduce both dividends and share repurchases is significantly greater during the financial crisis. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients implies that this effect is stronger for share repurchases.
In columns 2, 4, and 6, we add the interaction terms of the financial crisis dummy with measures of the firm's susceptibility to the credit supply shock. The coefficient on the interaction terms involving cash are significant in columns 2 and 6, while the coefficient of leverage is statistically significant in column 2. These findings imply that the impact of the financial crisis on the likelihood of a reduction in total payout is greater for firms with higher leverage. For firms with smaller cash holdings, the financial crisis appears to increase the likelihood of reductions in repurchases and total payout. Finally, the interaction term Financial Crisis * Tobin's Q is significantly positive in columns 2 and 6. These findings support the view that firms that are more likely to require external financing are more likely to adjust discretionary payouts during the financial crisis as a substitute source of funds.
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[Insert Table 3 ]
Payout reductions as a source of funds
Our findings in Table 3 indicate that, during the financial crisis, firms exhibit an increased propensity to retain cash flow rather than pay it out to shareholders. Such a propensity is consistent with the view that firms use payout reductions as an alternative source of funds in response to increased financing frictions during the crisis. In this section, we explore how firms use the funds that would otherwise have been paid out to shareholders. We first document the magnitude of cash savings from payout reductions and compare this magnitude with levels of cash and investment. We then investigate whether the sample firms increase cash reserves or use the funds for corporate investment that would otherwise have gone unfunded.
Cash savings from payout reductions
In Table 4 , we report evidence on the magnitude of the cash savings from payout reductions relative to levels of current cash holdings and investment. In the first row of Table 4 , we show that among firms reducing dividends or repurchases (or both), the median reduction amounts to cash savings of $34.0 million. These savings are economically meaningful; they represent 31% of the firm's 2007 cash balance and 53% of its 2007 level of capital expenditures and research and development (R&D) expenditures.
Similarly, we find large savings if we restrict the sample to either those firms that just reduce dividends or those that just reduce repurchases. For dividend reducers, the median savings is $11.4 million, which amounts to 22% of the company's cash balance and 24% of its combined capital expenditures and R&D. For firms that reduce repurchases, the median savings is $31.7 million, which amounts to 29% of the company's cash balance and 50% of its level of investment.
To provide additional perspective on the magnitude of the cash savings from payout reductions, we also compute pro-forma 2010 cash and investment levels. Following a process similar to that in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), we calculate 2010 pro forma cash-toasset ratios and pro-forma investment-to-total asset ratios for firms that reduce payout during the crisis period. To calculate these pro-forma ratios, we assume that the firms did not reduce payout during the crisis, but maintained all other operating and financing decisions. Thus, for example, to compute pro-forma 2010 cash, we assume that the company made its actual operating and financing decisions in 2010, but did not have the cash savings from the payout reduction.
Similarly, for pro-forma investment (capital expenditures + R&D), we assume that the firm made its actual operating and financing decisions, but did not have the cash savings from the payout reductions available for investment.
As shown in Table 4 , the median pro-forma cash-to-asset ratio is 0.090 for the firms that reduce total payout. This is substantially lower than the firm's actual cash-to-total asset ratio of 0.131 in 2010. Perhaps more importantly, we show that without the cash savings from the payout reduction, nearly 19% of the payout reducers would have been unable to implement their chosen operating plans without running out of cash. The results are similar for the subsamples of firms that reduce dividends and that reduce repurchases separately.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Similarly, when we compute pro-forma investment rates, we observe a median pro-forma ratio of investment-to-total assets of 0.018, well below the median actual investment rate of 0.051. Conditional on their chosen financing plans, over 36% of the firms would have been unable to undertake any capital expenditures or R&D without the cash savings from the payout reductions. Again, the results are similar for the subsamples of firms that reduce dividends and those that reduce repurchases.
Taken together, the findings in Table 4 imply that the payout reductions are economically large enough to have a meaningful impact on the firm's cash reserves or investment policy. Put differently, for the firm to have followed its chosen liquidity and investment policies in the absence of payout reductions, it would have had to access external financing that was particularly costly during the crisis period.
Cash holdings over time
The precautionary motive for holding cash asserts that in the presence of costly external financing, firms hold cash as a buffer against adverse shocks to cash flows. To the extent that the financial crisis represents an exogenous shock to the cost and supply of finance, the precautionary motive predicts that firms should react to such a shock by building up their cash reserves.
Alternatively, it is possible that firms turn to reductions in cash balances along with payout reductions as sources of funds during a period of restricted supply of credit. To explore these possibilities, we examine whether firms increase their cash holdings despite deteriorating credit conditions and declining earnings during the crisis. [Insert Figure 5 ]
The association between cash balances and payout reductions
In 
The results of the model in Column 1, 3, and 5 indicate that, after controlling for investment opportunities, contemporaneous cash flow, leverage, cash savings from payout reductions, and firm fixed effects, cash balances are reduced, on average, during the financial crisis period for the total payout and repurchase samples, but unchanged in the dividend sample.
Similarly, the coefficient on Cash Savings from Payout is positively associated with cash balances for total payout and repurchases, but insignificant for dividend paying firms. This finding is consistent with the general view that dividends are cut as a last resort when cash flows are poor and that during such times, firms are not building cash reserves.
[Insert Table 5] In Columns 2, 4, and 6, we include the interaction term of Cash Savings from Payout and Financial Crisis to test whether the impact of the cash savings from payout reductions on cash reserves is different during the financial crisis. The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive for total payout, dividends, and repurchases. These findings suggest that, all else equal, cash savings from payout reductions have a greater positive impact on cash reserves in the crisis period than in prior years. The results in Table 5 are consistent with the view that during the crisis, firms use payout reductions as a means of preserving their cash balances during a period in which there is a restricted supply of external capital.
Payout reductions and investment
In addition to building or maintaining cash reserves, the cash savings from payout reductions during the crisis period could be used to invest in projects that might otherwise have gone unfunded due to restricted credit supply during the crisis. To explore this possibility, we would ideally compare the actual levels of investment for firms with payout reductions with what that level of investment would have been in the absence of a payout reduction. Because the latter is unknown, we adopt two approaches. In the first, we use a difference-in-difference matching estimation approach, while in the second, we estimate panel regression models with firm fixed effects.
Difference-in-Difference Matched Estimator
In the first approach, we begin by estimating the likelihood of a positive payout during the 2008-09 crisis period. For this estimate, we include all firms that have the necessary data available, excluding financials and utilities. The dependent variable is set to one if the firm has a positive average total payout for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise. To control for profitability and firm performance, we include return on equity, free cash flow-to-total assets, the firm's buy-and-hold returns over the prior two years, and non-operating income-to-total assets.
To control for financial constraints, we include cash-to-assets, short-term debt-to-assets, and long-term debt-to-assets. To control for investments and investment opportunities, we include market-to-book, R&D-to-total assets, capital expenditures-to-total assets, and Tobin's Q. We also include firm size (log of total assets), firm age, and industry dummies. All continuous independent variables are the averages from fiscal year 2005 and 2006.
11 Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors from the probit model. Not surprisingly, we find that larger and more mature firms with higher cash holdings and greater free cash flow are more likely to distribute a positive payout to their shareholders during the financial 11 Note that these models are similar to those that we estimated earlier in Table 3 . The primary differences are that in the models estimated in Table 3 , the sample is limited to firms with positive payouts in 2005-06 and tests for the likelihood of a subsequent payout reduction. In Table 6 , we include all firms and test for the likelihood of a positive payout during the crisis period.
crisis, whereas firms with higher long-term debt and larger investment (capital expenditures and R&D) are less likely to pay the shareholders during the financial crisis.
[Insert Table 6] Based on the estimated coefficients as reported in Table 6 , we then derive the propensity score, i.e., the probability of a firm having positive payout during the crisis. For each firm with a positive payout, we identify a matching non-paying firm within the same industry that has the closest propensity score to the paying firm. In other words, we seek to identify a set of firms with similar recent performance, financial resources, financial constraints, and investment opportunities that elect not to make a positive payout during the crisis period. This process results in a sample of 1,215 firms that have a positive payout during the financial crisis and a matching set of 1,215 firms that do not make a payout to shareholders.
In Table 7 score matched non-paying firms. In the pre-crisis period, capital expenditures-to-assets are not statistically different for paying firms and matched non-paying firms. However, during the financial crisis, the capital expenditure-to-assets ratio for the non-paying firms is significantly greater than that for the payers. Moreover, both the percentage change in capital expenditure-toassets and the change in the capital expenditure-to-assets are statistically higher for non-paying firms than for paying firms. If we examine the combined sum of R&D and capital expenditures, we again find that non-paying firms have higher investment rates than paying firms during the crisis period. However, this is also true prior to the crisis. The change in the combined sum of R&D and capital expenditures from the pre-crisis to the crisis period is larger for non-paying firms than for paying firms, but the difference is not statistically significant.
[Insert 
We estimate the model using firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics. Thus the model tests for within-firm changes in investment policy during the financial crisis period, and whether these changes are a function of the firm's payout decision.
The results are reported in Table 8 . The significantly negative coefficient on Financial Crisis indicates that the level of investment declines during the financial crisis for the total payout and dividend samples. The positive coefficient on Cash Savings from Payout indicates that payers, on average, have higher investment rates when payout is reduced. This result holds when payout is measured as total payout (dividends + repurchases), dividends or repurchases. When we interact the financial crisis dummy with the cash savings from payout variable (Financial Crisis * Cash Savings from Payout), we find evidence (at the 10% significance level) that the positive impact of cash savings from payout reductions on investment is greater during the crisis period for the total payout sample. In the dividend and repurchase samples, the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant. For these samples, payout reductions appear to be used as a source of funds for investment in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Of course, as we documented earlier, the likelihood of a payout reduction is much greater during the crisis period.
Thus, on net, the importance of payout reductions as a source of funds is much greater during the financial crisis period.
[Insert Table 8 ]
Evidence from zero-payout firms
As a final test, we contrast the behavior of firms that reduce payout with those that made no payouts in the years prior to the crisis. For the latter group, payout reductions are obviously not a feasible source of funds through the crisis period. Therefore, their behavior during the crisis represents a useful counterfactual. Specifically, if payout reductions are used by some firms as a source of funds during the crisis, we expect zero payout firms to either turn towards other sources of funds (i.e. cash reductions) or be forced to make greater cuts in investment during the crisis period.
To test these conjectures, we estimate two sets of regressions on a sample that includes 
In other words, we test whether cash holdings are affected by the financial crisis and whether the impact of the crisis differs for zero payout firms. We estimate similar regressions in which the dependent variable is investment (R&D + capital expenditures scaled by assets) in columns (3) and (4).
[Insert Table 9] The results in columns (1) and (3) indicate that, on average, both the level of cash and the level of investment are higher in zero payout firms. Moreover, the negative coefficient on the financial crisis dummy indicates that both cash and investment levels are reduced during the crisis. More importantly, the significant and negative coefficients on the interaction terms (Financial Crisis*Zero Payout) in models (2) and (4) (2010) and Duchin et al. (2010) in that they report real consequences of the financial crisis for firms whose ex ante financial policies left them with less flexibility for adjustment.
Conclusion
We use the 2008-2009 financial crisis as a natural experiment to analyze how firms respond to changes in the relative cost of internal and external funds. Our study differs from many prior studies of firm behavior during the financial crisis in that we study the extent to which certain financial policies themselves adjust on the margin in response to the credit supply shock of the financial crisis. Specifically, we analyze how (if at all) firms alter corporate payout policy and whether such changes in payout policy appear to be prompted by a desire for firms to seek a substitute source of funds following a shock to the cost of external funds.
12 At first glance, it may appear surprising that the coefficient on cash flow is significantly negative in all four models since prior literature generally documents a positive association between cash flow and both cash holdings and investment. The reason for this is that much of the prior literature focuses on firm fixed effects models when estimating cash-cash flow and investment-cash flow sensitivities. By contrast, Table  9 is cross-sectional in nature and firms with zero payout tend to have higher investment rates and cash holdings, but lower cash flow.
Our evidence indicates that payout reductions are larger and more pervasive during the crisis period, particularly for those firms that we expect to be most susceptible to shocks to the supply of credit -i.e., firms most likely to require external capital. Moreover, the cash savings resulting from such payout reductions are large relative to pre-crisis cash balances and investment levels.
Our panel regressions indicate that firms use these cash savings to build cash reserves and preserve investment. Specifically, we find that cash savings from payout reductions are positively associated with both cash balances and investment during the crisis period.
Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that the financial crisis increased the cost of external financing sufficiently that a number of firms turned to payout reductions as a substitute form of financing. Thus, we extend prior findings on the real effects of the financial crisis by showing that financial policies themselves adjust on the margin in response to the credit supply shock of the financial crisis.
Our evidence also confirms prior evidence on the flexibility of share repurchases.
Although we document an unusual increase in dividend reductions, we show that firms primarily turn to reductions in share repurchases as a source of funds during the financial crisis. These findings are similar to those in Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2012) who, like us, report that dividends are more persistent through the financial crisis than are share repurchases. Such findings complement those of Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) , who report that CFOs state they would rather cut investment than cut dividends, and Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2012) , who report that even those firms facing cash shortfalls exhibit a strong reluctance to cut dividends.
Apparently, even during a period of constrained access to external capital, dividend reductions continue to be viewed by firms as being a particularly costly source of funds.
Appendix
All variables are annual, unless otherwise noted.
Variable Name Description
Firm Age First annual appearance in Compustat subtracted from current fiscal year.
BHR
Previous 12-month market adjusted buy-hold return from fiscal end date.
CapEx/TA Capital Expenditures (Item 128, CAPX) divided by total assets (Item 6, AT).
Cash/TA Cash and short term investments (Item 1, CHE) divided by total assets (Item 6, AT).
Cash Flow/LAG TA Operating income before depreciation (Item 13, OIBDP) divided by lag total assets (Item 6, AT).
Cash Savings from Payout Previous payout minus payout, then scaled by lag total assets. Previous payout is calculated as the average total payout from the prior two years for total payout (repurchases plus dividends), the average repurchase amount from the prior two years for repurchases, and prior year's dividend amount for dividends. Total Payout Dividends plus repurchases. Repurchases is calculated as the purchase of common and preferred stock (Item 115, PRSTKC) minus any reduction in the value of net number of preferred stocks outstanding (Item 56, PSTKRV). If repurchase amount is less than one percent of previous year's market capitalization, repurchase amount is set to zero.
Total Payout/TA Dividends plus repurchases, divided by total assets (Item 6, AT).
Table 1
Time-series of the percentage of dividend paying and repurchasing firms This table reports the percentage of firms that pay dividends, repurchase, or pay dividends and repurchase for the given year. The sample includes all Compustat firms except financial firms and utilities from 1990 to 2010. Dividend payers are firms that have a positive dividend amount in the given year. Repurchasers are firms that have a positive value for share repurchases during the given year. Share repurchases is computed as the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) minus any reduction in the value of net number of preferred stocks outstanding (PSTKRV). If the repurchase amount is less than one percent of the previous year's market capitalization, the repurchase amount is set to zero. Table 2 Time-series of the percentage of firms reducing payout This table reports the percentage of firms that reduce dividends, eliminate dividends, and reduce repurchases for the given year. The sample includes all Compustat firms except financial firms and utilities from 1990 to 2010. Firms are classified as reducing dividend if they have a positive dividend payout in the prior year and reduced dividend payout but less than 100% during the given year. Firms that have positive dividend payout in the prior year and have zero dividend payout in the given year are classified as firms that eliminate dividends. Firms are classified as repurchasing firms if they have a positive two-year average repurchase amount. Repurchases are calculated as the total expenditures on the purchase of common and preferred stocks (PRSTKC) minus any reduction in the value of net number of preferred stocks outstanding (PSTKRV). If repurchase is less than one percent of the market capitalization, value is set to zero. If repurchasing firms reduce repurchasing by 5% or more from their previous two-year average repurchase amount, firms are classified as reducing repurchases. Table 3 Logit regression of payout reduction This table reports the marginal effects from the logit regression of payout reductions in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The sample includes all firms who have a positive payout average from the previous two years. For total payout and repurchases, the dependent variable is equal to one if the payout decreases 5% or more from the previous two year average payout, zero otherwise. For dividends, the dependent variable is equal to one if the dividend amount decreases from the previous year's dividend amount. Financial Crisis is a binary variable equal to one if fiscal year is 2008, 2009, median cash-to-total assets, median R&D & CapEx-to-total assets, pro forma cash-tototal assets and pro forma R&D & CapEx-to-total assets ratios surrounding the financial crisis for firms that reduce dividends, repurchases, and total payout. The sample includes all Compustat firms except financial and utility firms that have a positive payout. For reduced dividends in crisis, the firm must have a positive dividend payout in the prior year and reduce dividend amount during the financial crisis. For reduced repurchases in crisis, the firms must have a positive payout average from the prior two fiscal years and have a repurchase reduction greater than 5% from the from the prior two fiscal repurchase average during the financial crisis. For total payout, firms must have a positive payout average from the prior two fiscal years and have a total payout reduction greater than 5% from the prior two fiscal total payout average during the financial crisis. Cash savings from payout is the previous payout minus current payout, and then scaled by lag total assets. Previous payout is calculated as the average total payout from the prior two years for total payout, the average repurchase amount from the prior two years for repurchases, and prior year's dividend amount for dividends. Market Leverage is the lag of the sum of long and current liabilities-to-market capitalization. Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . Cash flow is contemporaneous operating income before depreciation and amortization-to-lag total assets. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. All variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% level. ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Total Payout
Total Payout Dividends Dividends Repurchases Repurchases Table 7 Comparison of investment for paying firms and matched non-paying firms This table reports the difference-in-means estimates for firm-level investments (measured as the ratio of capital expenditure-to-total assets and R&D and capital expenditure-to-total assets). The sample includes the firm who paid out during the financial crisis and matched firms who did not payout during the financial crisis using propensity score matching. "Before" variables are defined as the averages in fiscal years [2005] [2006] . "During" variables are defined as the averages in fiscal years [2008] [2009] . If R&D data is missing, it is set to zero. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. ***, **, or * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. from payout is the previous payout minus current payout, and then scaled by lag total assets. Previous payout is calculated as the average total payout from the prior two years for total payout, the average repurchase amount from the prior two years for repurchases, and prior year's dividend amount for dividends. Market Leverage is the lag of the sum of long and current liabilities-to-market capitalization. Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . Cash flow is contemporaneous operating income before depreciation and amortization-to-lag total assets. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Paying
Total Payout
Total Payout Dividends Dividends Repurchases Repurchases Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . Cash flow is contemporaneous operating income before depreciation and amortization-to-lag total assets. Market Leverage is the lag of the sum of long and current liabilities-to-market capitalization. Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry definitions. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. All variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% level. ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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